[Related to: Three Worlds Collide; the True Prisoner’s Dilemma]
[This post has been linked by Slate Star Codex and as such will be more tightly moderated. Accusing anyone of wanting to commit genocide, kidnap children, commit murder, put people in concentration camps, etc., unless the person has specifically stated that they want to do so, will get your comment deleted. In general, I expect people to maintain a high standard of charity, intellectual honesty, and integrity. Please try to understand your opponents rather than humiliating them. Comments that fail to do so will be deleted. I am considering closing comments and will do so if the conversation gets too heated.]
According to moral foundations theory, liberals tend to primarily think about morality in terms of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity– that is, liberals tend to be primarily concerned with whether people are happy and treated equally and justly. In addition to being concerned about harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, conservatives tend to be concerned with three other moral foundations: ingroup/loyalty (sticking with people who stick with you, patriotism, self-sacrifice for the group, avoiding treachery and betrayal); authority/respect (obedience, deference to those in charge); and purity/sanctity (avoiding disgusting and contaminated things, elevating sacred things).
Of course, as with any psychological research, this may not replicate. But all the liberals I know are like “see, I told you conservatives believe in nonsensical bullshit” and all the conservatives I know are like “see, I told you liberals are literally incapable of moral reasoning,” so I suspect it’s getting at something real.
(Note that this post applies to conservatives and liberals only in the Anglosphere: people in other countries have different arrangements of moral foundations. While these are two common ways moral foundations are arranged, many people have their own unusual arrangements. Some liberals still use loyalty, purity, and authority foundations but care about them less than the primary liberal foundations. In addition, some conservatives only have the “liberal” moral foundations, and some liberals use the “conservative” moral foundations: for example, liberal opposition to GMOs is likely rooted in a purity foundation. However, I am happy to declare that the relevant conservatives are on My Side, and that the people who hate GMOs are not.)
Many of the centrists I know seem to take this as a reason that liberals ought to change our values. This is most prominent in Jonathan Haidt’s the Righteous Mind, which argues that we harm/care and fairness/reciprocity people need to expand our moral foundations in order to include all five. (This is a pretty good summary of his argument, for people who haven’t read the book.) I strongly disagree.
As an analogy, consider aesthetics. One could very reasonably make the case that the natural human aesthetic sense prefers realistic paintings of beautiful landscapes with water, trees, large animals, beautiful women, children, and well-known historical figures. The Wikipedia page provides an example of a generally preferred image:
However, art of this sort leaves me cold. The art I find most heartbreakingly, exquisitely beautiful looks like this:
The first time I saw it, Joan Miro’s The Birth of the World moved me to tears from its sheer beauty. I make a special effort to visit it every time I am in New York City, including taking my husband to see it on our honeymoon so he could understand my aesthetics better. (Unfortunately, the picture doesn’t capture it; the painting is much more beautiful in person.)
Needless to say, my aesthetics don’t line up with normal human aesthetics very well at all. Does this mean I should try to shift my aesthetics to correspond to what normal humans value? Is there, perhaps, some deep evolutionary wisdom I am missing in why trees are prettier than abstract shades of grey? Of course not. I like what I like; the things that give me pleasure are the things that give me pleasure. It is irrelevant that this is an unpopular human preference. And while evolution did give me my aesthetic sense in the first place, its purpose in doing so was maximizing my number of grandchildren, which is not a metric I particularly care about.
Similarly, I value the things that I value. I don’t want to change myself so I value different things, because then I would waste resources on things I do not currently value. I am not going to sacrifice my own moral sense because other people do morality differently, any more than I’m going to decorate my house with a painting of a nice landscape because other people do aesthetics differently. (This is the Gryffindor Primary in me.)
Of course, from a conservative perspective, I am an incomprehensible moral mutant. I can put myself in their shoes. When I read writing by a person who only has the fairness/reciprocity intuition, I seethe with anger; I imagine a conservative feels the same when I say “from a moral perspective, an American is worth no more than an African.” From their perspective, I don’t simply have different values, I actively rejoice in evil. I tell cute childhood stories about replacing “Respect Authority” with “Question Authority” in the Girl Scout Law. I urge people with all the eloquence I can muster not to prioritize their ingroups over other groups of people. I talk about the beauty of Serrano’s Piss Christ; my strongest criticism is that I feel it’s bad form to court controversy when your art cannot stand on its own. I imagine someone actively rejoicing in denying a person a fair trial because they deserve to be in prison– not just accepting this as a grim reality, but thinking it is good and right and virtuous– and I shudder. They must feel similarly about me.
However, from my perspective, conservatives are perfectly willing to sacrifice things that actually matter in the world– justice, equality, happiness, an end to suffering– in order to suck up to unjust authority or help the wealthy and undeserving or keep people from having sex lives they think are gross.
There’s some conflict here.
Conservatives and liberals fundamentally cannot both get what they want. A society that is pleasing to conservatives will, from a liberal perspective, hurt vulnerable people for no reason other than the country they were born in or their interest in things other people find disgusting. A society that is pleasing to liberals will, from a conservative perspective, have three-fifths of ethics only present by sheer coincidence.
There is, I feel, opportunity for compromise. An outright war would be unpleasant for everyone. Conservatives do care about what liberals care about, even if they care about other things. From a harm/care perspective, you don’t want to do things that hurt other people, as long as they’re not excessively burdensome: from the liberal-values perspective, you should avoid drawing Mohammad or desecrating the Eucharist, although you are under no obligation to ensure your sex life is appealing to others.
And yet, fundamentally… it’s not true that conservatives as a group are working for the same goals as I am but simply have different ideas of how to pursue it. It’s not true that conservatives simply think that lowering taxes will stimulate the economy or that economic growth works better than foreign aid to help the global poor or that, as regrettable as it is for gay couples who long for children, children will be severely traumatized unless they are raised by heterosexuals. I would certainly prefer it to be that way. I want to have respect for all belief systems; I want to believe we’re all working for the same goals but simply disagree on certain facts.
But my read of the psychological evidence is that, from my value system, about half the country is evil and it is in my self-interest to shame the expression of their values, indoctrinate their children, and work for a future where their values are no longer represented on this Earth.
So it goes.
I’m not sure I understand this properly. Surely the ‘conservative’ values you’ve mentioned are irrelevant to morality? Maybe I’m baffled because you’re right and I’m liberal and so it makes sense I don’t get it, but I don’t know. I can understand the importance of loyalty, at least as far as it ties into reciprocity and the more ‘my country right or wrong’ full quote instead of just the first half, but obedience to authority and purity are not focused on ‘do no harm’, and putting them above/on equal importance to helping other people is genuinely a bad idea.
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Psychological scientists like Jonathan Haidt are sometimes interested in studying the intuitions and values that people have and the decisions they make irrespective of the researchers’ own views on whether those decisions are good or not. In my view as a psychology researcher, this is as important as a physicist doing their best to study the world as it is and not the world as it should be because (at least part of) our job is to find out what the world is like. If you want to change the world, you might benefit from genuinely understanding it first.
Moral foundations theory tries to explain the intuitions that people have about moral “right” and “wrong”. Many people report authority respect and in-group loyalty and maintaining purity are “right” and “wrong” – this is confirmed by research showing that many people think it is *morally wrong* to disrespect authority or betray their group in various ways.
So that’s interesting. Why would people think those things are “right” and “wrong”? I guess there’s a biological or cultural meme that told them those things are “right” or “wrong”. Why would that be? Well, if there are benefits to respecting authority or being loyalty to your group, then you’d expect both biological and cultural evolution to select for them. Believing something is right does at least weakly predict doing that thing, so if X behavior is beneficial, then it might also be advantageous to believe it’s moral.
And respecting authority can be beneficial to the individual and the group. Here are some examples that are less controversial: young children are better off if they obey their parents, because sometimes parents know the child’s long-term best interests better than the child does. An organization (whether it is a for-profit company or an activist organization) will be more effective if it can coordinate itself and usually that coordination requires some “leaders” and some other people who respect the leaders and do what they say. There are some anarchist and far-leftist activist organizations whose group identity requires *not* having a hierarchy or any respect for their own leaders, and those groups are notorious for failing because of their lack of coordination (remember Occupy Wall Street?).
Liberals might shy away from moralizing authority-respect, but even many liberals who don’t want to moralize it could at least see how authority-respect might be beneficial to the group or to the individual. With that in mind, you can see how cultural norms like authority-respect might get moralized even if *you personally* don’t think it’s appropriate to moralize it.
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OWS very definitely has leaders and a hierarchy.
Six people had control of the bank account. The disbursements were not subject to a democratic decision making process.
Likewise, tips offered to the drummers were seized ostensibly for use by the whole (but see above re: purse strings). Being able to seize resources from another is about as perfect a demonstration of dominance as you can have.
And the famous Progressive Stack is an explicit hierarchy for determining who get to speak and who has to listen.
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It might make more sense if you conceptualize morality as “rules about how people should act towards each other.” Cooperating typically leads to better results than an “everyone for themselves” ethos and so moral rules are ways of fostering cooperation. The foundations that progressives understand are the bare minimum required to prevent outright hostility (that is, you won’t cooperate with someone who cheats you) but are primarily phrased in terms of negative obligations and so aren’t sufficient for maintaining civil society, which is why we’ve been plunged into the world of “Bowling Alone.”
Authority: Two people are moving a sofa. Rather than each moving in the direction that they think is best, they should have one person direct it so that they act in concert. Note this isn’t a defense of unjust or corrupt authority: if the goal is to move the sofa into person A’s house, but the leader is guiding it towards person B’s instead, there’s still a problem. Just as followers have an obligation to respect authority, the authority has an obligation to act in the interest of the group.
Loyalty: If I see someone with a flat tire on the side of the road, I ought to help them out. Not only because they’ve been harmed by something, but because doing so builds social capital in the community. This doesn’t imply that Africans are less important than Americans, but for an American fostering community with Africans is harder and vice versa for Africans (the commute is too long, and saying “the world is my community” is a bad metaphor that gets you “Bowling Alone” in practice; naturally, the online equivalent of “changing a tire” applies to those in an online community regardless of nationality because it’s a community defined by a different notion of distance).
Purity: This is my weak foundation as well, so I’ll likely be worse at describing it, but what I’ve gathered from conversation with those who have a stronger intuitive grasp of this foundation, it’s a combination of “you shouldn’t weaken social bonds by deliberately and needlessly offending other people” and “be the best version of yourself that you can.”
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@James
I think Haidt is making a much stronger claim than you think. He’s not just saying that purity, authority, and loyalty have lots of practical benefits that liberals severely underrate. He’s saying that conservatives value these things as an end in themselves.
For instance, he is saying that to a conservative, obeying authority is intrinsically valuable. Disobeying authority is a disvalue in and of itself.
Imagine a hypothetical scenario where someone is given a choice between obeying an order from an authority to do something harmful, and disobeying that order. In this scenario there is irrefutable evidence available that the harm will occur, that it will not lead to any greater good, and that disobeying the authority will not weaken the fabric of society.
In this scenario a liberal would have no qualms about disobeying authority. Even a sophisticated rule utilitarian liberal who thinks authority has pragmatic value would have no qualms, since in this case they have irrefutable evidence that in this case the authority has no pragmatic value.
But if Haidt is right, a conservative would have qualms. They would see disobeying authority as an intrinsic moral bad. If the harm they are ordered to commit is small enough they might well commit it to avoid committing the intrinsic bad of disobeying authority.
I don’t know if Haidt is right or not. He might be, or it might be that conservatives are simply confused, and have slathered a layer of purity/authority/loyalty over the basic harm/fairness intuition, a layer that sufficient self-reflection can remove.
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I sort of think Haidt is missing a lot of ways that liberals use purity/sanctity, especially around food issues like GMOs. It’s just that WEIRD people are more apt to encounter people with different moral norms about purity and if you actually want to convince anybody who disagrees you have to frame your argument in terms of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity if you want to be convincing. So there’s a pressure to always talk and therefore think about morality in terms of those foundations.
I had a lot of criticisms of The Righteous Mind in general when I reviewed it on my blog.
http://hopefullyintersting.blogspot.com/2017/05/book-review-righteous-mind.html
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Consumer boycotts are where liberals most strongly show their use of purity/sanctity foundations.
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The usual reply I’ve seen is that those people are actually conservatives with a prog hat, i.e. that their gut reactions closely match those of a ‘typical’ conservative, but due to the upbringing and culture they’re immersed in, they twist those base foundations to express them with appropriately liberal vocabulary. This seems correct to me: much of the sex-negative, anti-bdsm, anti-kink etc etc discourse I’ve read looks like your typical conservative ‘eww, gross, people are having sex wrong’ sentiment rephrased to sound woke.
Lately I’ve been wondering if some libertarians aren’t the reverse case of that, i.e. people who are ‘genetic liberals’ but due to conservative upbringing, look at their values through conservative foundations’ lens.
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The paper Ozy cited is helpful – see figure 1 on page 1033. Self reported liberals still responded that purity, ingroup, and authority values were relevant to moral decisions, they just didn’t rate those values as important as frequently or with the same intensity as fairness and avoiding harm.
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(Thank you for that art experience description, I appreciate learning that!)
Also I apparently need to clarify more when I say I’m justice/fairness, because wow I’m pissed at that person too…
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(1) Surely indoctrinating conservatives’ children and shaming their values is intrinsically hurtful to conservatives? In that case, it should only be done where the benefits outweigh the hurt.
(2) When calculating benefits, you should also weigh in a certain amount of epistemic modesty. Communists thought their values were right and that the world would be a better place if they held a cultural revolution to kill all the intellectuals and bourgeoisie. They were wrong; even if not on communism itself, then at least arguably on the amount of intellectual capital they were destroying by killing all the intellectuals, with a consequent harm to the general welfare. Eugenics advocates thought *they* were doing the right thing for future generations, too, but Hitler took their ideas, ran with it, and ended up with full-on genocide.
I can see you might still fully agree with (1) and (2) in theory but proceed with the belief it’s *still* worth it to shame conservatives for conservativism. But maybe it might tip you in the direction of tolerating *some* marginally-harmful conservative ideas if they seem particularly important to conservatives, or if there’s any chance you might be wrong about your estimate of the harm they produce.
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Here’s an example: seems like there was a lot of fuss about Trump proposing a military parade. Apparently that’s against American values of… non-violence and keeping costs down? (idk when those have *ever* been American values) It’s not clear to me how there’s any actual violence involved in a military parade and as for cutting costs… I am sure that parade would be a tiny blip on the map of money the federal government wastes every year.
But projecting strength actually has arguable benefits for peace, and clear benefits for ingroup cohesion. Conservatives might quite like it. So I felt like a military parade in DC was one of those things conservatives should probably just suck-it-up on and accept if it came down to it.
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*liberals. Liberals should just suck-it-up and accept it.
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Yeah, this seems like a perfect example of liberals doing something Haight-conservative.
Military parades are associated with gross icky murder, and worse, they’re promoting/showing respect to people who should be low-status! Not in a way that could possibly cause any harm, mind you, but the status!
Given that some people have speculated that these sorts of flaws in Haight’s predictions are caused by “genetic conservatives” being raised liberal, and the content of the OP, I’m curious whether Ozy feels intuitively against military parades?
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Uh, when I was a kid I used to enjoy the Air and Sea Show until I found out what the planes did and that made me feel sick and I didn’t want to go there anymore? I don’t think there’s anything wrong with other people enjoying the Air and Sea Show though, it’s just a personal thing.
I guess in theory military parades might make people more pro-war on the margin and that might be bad.
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> we both care about fairness and equality – but disagree strongly about how best to bring about fairness and equality. … they think it is inherently good to torture the enemies of the state
Considering that Communists themselves decided who is the “enemy of the state”, this is a distinction without a difference. It means that people should be equal and treated fairly, unless you decide that you don’t like them for whatever random reason.
Imagine a dictator who would proclaim to be anti-racist and anti-slavery, with the exception that it is okay for the enemies of his regime to be enslaved. Also, by a royal decree he would summarily declare all black people to be enemies of his regime. Would you say that this dictator shares your anti-racist and anti-slavery values?
Here are some real-life examples of things that could have made you declared an enemy of the state in the former Soviet Union, punishable by ten years in a forced labor camp (which was de facto a death camp, because the average time of survival there was about three months): having traveled outside of Soviet Union; having a foreign former classmate; speaking Esperanto; being a intellectual in a minority ethnicity in Soviet Union e.g. those countries currently called “…stan”, etc. (For more information, see The Gulag Archipelago.)
Do you still believe these people are your deepest values?
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oops, posted under wrong comment; see below
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I addressed the first one in the sentence starting “From a harm/care perspective, you don’t want to do things that hurt other people.”
As for the second, I think it is important to distinguish facts and values. To some extent, Communists and I agree on values– we both care about fairness and equality– but disagree strongly about how best to bring about fairness and equality. To some extent, Communists (of the sort that have Cultural Revolutions) and I disagree strongly about values, because they think it is inherently good to torture the enemies of the state, and I don’t think it’s inherently good to torture anyone. (That is, they have far stronger loyalty and authority intuitions than I do.) In the latter case, it doesn’t make much sense to go “be humble! you might value not torturing people!”– the Communist would just go “uh, yes I do” and torture away. The better strategy is either to cause change in values– perhaps by encouraging empathy with those who are tortured– or just to have a Nuremburg trial.
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This treats what conservatives or progressives currently want as more terminal than it really is. Our intuitive responses can be overridden and are subject to revision – we’ve all probably had the experience of accepting a moral truth that still felt off-putting. And it’s coherent to say that one’s own values could be wrong and shouldn’t be promoted if they are. “If I should rejoice in denying a person a fair trial, I desire to rejoice in denying a person a fair trial’, and so on.
People may be drawn to certain views because of their psychology, but that’s just the first step, not the conclusion. Of course, in practice, many don’t go beyond that, but it still suggests a different attitude towards your enemies from the one you should have if they were consistent paperclip-maximizers.
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I’m not sure I agree that liberals lack the final three types, just that they don’t have a clearly recognizable societal institutions focused on them.
For conservatives, those three are embodied in various combinations by religion, the military, and general patriotism, all very popular on the right. For liberals, though, there’s definitely a purity morality, not only about things like GMOs and “natural” foods, but also how you can’t be friends with X because their cousin’s friend’s roommate’s dog’s vet’s sister is pro-life. I would say the ingroup loyalty and authority are also similar, but more diffuse, with loyalty expected to groups united by various political or identity features rather than geography or proximity and authority being more decentralized to those who have, via actions and signaling, demonstrated “moral authority”.
Also, your art preference made me think of this:
https://me.me/embed/i/20401784via me.me
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I agree that “liberal values” and “conservative values” don’t 100% match up to the liberal and conservative belief sets, but I don’t exactly think of people who are opposed to GMOs and natural food and who refuse to be friends with people they disagree with as being on My Side here.
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These are not the words of a liberal or utilitarian.
“But my read of the psychological evidence is that, from my value system, about half the country is evil and it is in my self-interest to shame the expression of their values, indoctrinate their children, and work for a future where their values are no longer represented on this Earth.”
A liberal would recoil with horror from the phrase “indoctrinate their children”. You sound like those missionaries who set up the Indian residential schools in the USA and Canada.
And a utilitarian would know about the mountains of bodies stacked up by people who refused to coexist with others whose values they found to be repugnant or incomprehensible. A utilitarian would know people fight back against outsiders who want to indoctrinate their children. A utilitarian would know conflicts can escalate quickly, and the people who start them don’t often remain in control. A utilitarian isn’t a pacifist, but a utilitarian knows how dangerous and destructive and uncontrollable conflict is and wouldn’t toy with it casually.
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I think we do have to indoctrinate people into liberalism. People are not naturally liberal, and one of the primary purposes of the public-school system is to indoctrinate people into beliefs such as “you should respect others’ free speech” and “you should leave people alone if they are not bothering you.”
You will notice a little bit above that I am opposed to outright war. I have no intention of slaughtering the infidel. It is perfectly possible to use shame without killing people: in fact, the shift from killing people you disagree with to telling people you disagree with that they are evil and should be ashamed is the entire thing that religious freedom is.
Also, isn’t it a little bit hypocritical for you to be criticizing shaming people in the exact same post where you say liberals should recoil from my beliefs in horror and that I sound like a missionary who set up the Indian residential school? Shouldn’t you be saying something like “gosh, I see we disagree! Let us sing kumbaya and hold hands”?
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People are not naturally liberal
I am shocked, shocked I tell you! 🙂 You mean Rousseau and the anarchists lied to me? Oh heavens, surely not!
That’s a conservative viewpoint, if you don’t mind me saying so. No, people are not naturally mild and kind and lovely, which is why we need the helps of tradition and authority and social structures to bolster up our attempts to not wallop each other over the head and rob the goodies we desire from each other.
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@Deiseach
Have you been around toddlers? Maybe not all of them, but a rather non-trivial part are, by adult human ethical standards, horrible monsters.
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But how can you even use shame on them?
Shame only works coming from people one sees as moral peers, more or less.
The Outgroup can’t shame you effectively; if they could, they wouldn’t be the outgroup.
(Indeed, the outgroup’s attempts at shame tend to be worn as a badge of honor; see pretty much any attempt at one side shaming the other, ever.
Rational discussion is not very effective [“we’re why we can’t have nice things”], but it at least has a chance of working across ingroup/outgroup boundaries.)
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@ozymandias
OK; You’re against war. All you want is the unconditional surrender of your enemies. All you want is to dictate to them how their children will be educated so you can bring about the total extinction of their values.
OK; You have no intention of slaughtering the infidel. What happens when the infidel fights back against your schemes in ways that are unjustified, unjustifiable? What happens when the infidel commits atrocities to stop you? It doesn’t even matter what you think should happen after that, because nobody nearly as good as you will be put in charge of dealing with them. Your part will be played out by then.
How much worse do things have to get before you get scared? How many more assassinations or terrorist attacks or riots do you think it would take to pitch us into war right now? What happens now if there’s an incident like the Boston massacre or Bloody Sunday?
How much do we have to lose before peace looks good compared to victory?
Maybe I’m being dramatic. Maybe the risk isn’t so great as that. I’m not sure. I don’t want to find out.
I can see why you think I’m a hypocrite, but I think it comes from a misunderstanding. I’m not saying you shouldn’t express your values. I’m not saying you shouldn’t say “shame on you”. I’m not saying you shouldn’t try to convince people.
I’m saying you shouldn’t essentialize other people’s “terminal” values into ugly stereotypes based on half baked science.
I’m saying that just because persuasion seems impossible doesn’t justify slamming the door in it’s face and condemning the unpersuaded as mutants. (And why does it even seem impossible? Aren’t we living in a time of remarkably fast shifts of moral consensus?)
I’m saying don’t force their children into schools their parents would never agree too, schools that teach them to be ashamed of who they are, schools that teach them that their family and neighbors and traditions and religion are backwards and evil.
I understand some things are zero sum. I understand how little room there is for compromise on some issues. But not everything is zero sum. Not everything needs to be doggedly pressed until total victory is achieved, until there is nothing left of the enemy but fading memories.
I understand that sometimes, many times, there are superordinate moral considerations that override priorities like peace and toleration. But when they don’t, can’t you find it in your heart to just leave them alone?
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Can you explain to me the difference between “persuasion of the enemy’s children” and “dictating how the enemy’s children shall be educated so you can bring about the total extinction of their values”? Particularly from the perspective of the enemy whose children are being persuaded?
Because, like, from my point of view, if you’re like “we taught your children to think you’re disgusting but, like, we were nice about it,” I would be pretty pissed off! And I imagine conservatives would feel the same way about a liberal teacher reading And Tango Makes Three in class, or me writing a popular book series where people who accept those others consider to be disgusting are unambiguously depicted as heroic.
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@Ozy
I want that edit button 😛
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@ozy
That’s a good question.
How much force are you willing to use to enact your indoctrination program?
Are you going to try to persuade autonomous adults or are you demanding access to six year olds?
Are you going to try to make indoctrination a requirement for their educational attainment and job prospects?
Are you going to try to prevent the other side from making their own argument?
It’s a sliding scale. One on extreme you’re just making moral arguments to autonomous people who are free to be persuaded or not. The other extreme would be to literally kidnap children and put them in boarding schools.
Nothing quite that bad is going on now, of course. But education of minors is run by the state, and it is very expensive to opt out of, especially if you’re poor. And college is the great credential gating access to most non-terrible jobs, with most colleges run by people on “your side” who are dead set on indoctrination.
Conservatives believe that progressives control education and weaponize it against them. That’s not the only cause for the current culture war / political calamity. But it’s an important reason for it. And here you are saying “yes we are, so what”.
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Well, you’re making a consequentialist harm/care argument against “indoctrinate their children”, but it’s only about the collateral damage and possibly low efficiency of the existing methods – not against the goal “their values should be erased from existence” per se. American Indian boarding schools weren’t just bad because their methods were horrible; their goals, as far as I’m concerned, were terrible too, since “failure to love Jesus” is not a value that I want to be eliminated.
Also, “not indoctrinating children” is not really an option. The choice is between their family vs their community vs the state having more say in their intellectual development. And you can’t just say that they should be exposed to the plurality of ideas either because, while a reasonable proposition, “expose to the plurality of ideas” is in itself an ideological proposition, which goes very much against the values of many families, who think that reading Harry Potter would doom their children to eternal damnation.
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Is this a failure of the outside view in which you ignore the approximately coinflip odds that conservative values are the “right” ones, or are you really proposing that it’s paperclip maximziers vs sprocket maximizers and the only solution is to eradicate the other team while bending their outputs into serviceable clips?
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I am not a moral realist, no.
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It’s not just moral realism, if your belief system doesn’t have a term for “Don’t indoctrinate people” then you end up with a utility-maximizer deciding that due to finite space available in museums we’d be better off if we got rid of the grey paintings and just indoctrinated everyone to like trees. Nevermind the implications around wireheading, that seems horrifyingly illiberal.
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This was an uncomfortable and disconcerting read. From your perspective, I suppose I’m evil. That being at the forefront of my mind probably isn’t doing great things to the niceness of this comment.
One of the main reasons I read your writing and tend to feel generally optimistic about the prospect of cooperation with you and people with similar values is your pretty solid history of not doing anything like “[shaming] the expression of their values, [indoctrinating] their children, and [working] for a future where their values are no longer represented on this Earth” towards other groups. I guess maybe my attitude is uncommon enough that it’s worth turning away a few of us to more effectively combat the rest…
From my perspective it looks like there is some equivocation here between the morals in question and the behavior of a group of people with those morals plus a great deal of social/cultural/political history and baggage. I can see that there are many and varied harmful policies supported by conservatives, and I can sympathize with somebody who wants to prevent those from harming people. In the very abstract, it seems like a mistake to see group X is doing bad things, and that group X leans towards a certain preference, and to opt for wiping that preference from the Earth.* My (self-serving) stance is that purging a really common trait like that from the population would be akin to exterminating all the species you don’t like in an ecosystem and hoping it works out with just the ones you’re trying to grow. It seems like if it worked it would make people’s psyche’s more fragile/less versatile and in the more likely case where it didn’t it would leave a lot of people drifting with no outlet for some important-seeming moral feelings. Better, in my opinion to attempt to cooperate to find harm-reducing things worthy of respect, fair things with an aspect of purity, and groups with internal loyalty on an individual level and a broader circle of concern on a group level.
And I didn’t actually read the argument for changing your own values, but for what it’s worth, I think it’s in one’s self-interest to do some reflecting to see if one already has those moral feelings and to listen to them if one does, since I think it results in a more satisfying life. And I think it’s super-erogatory for somebody who doesn’t have those moral feelings to develop a sense of what triggers them in the people around them, to be better able to produce norms/an environment that’s reasonably welcoming to people with those moral feelings. I don’t think I would encourage attempting to change your morals to match mine.
*I suppose to some extent that could be grounded in your perspective that I’m willing to trade some (important) care for some (unimportant) respect and an idea that that means groups of me fundamentally can’t avoid being harmful. But on the other hand I don’t see that much difference between having a preference for respect/purity/loyalty and having any other preference except that I call it “good” when I choose loyalty and not when I choose a landscape over an abstract piece.
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Genisage, do you believe that authority, purity and ingroup/outgroup are moral goods in and of themselves that liberals are overlooking, or that they are valuable to some other moral goal?
Relatedly, do you think Ozy is right when they say:
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I think they’re moral goods in and of themselves. I don’t think liberals are overlooking them.
I think the quoted paragraph is correct.
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I have a strong suspicion that most liberal people – even in the EA circles, but much more outside of them – do have an intuition that Americans are more valuable than Africans, and certain policy proposals that embody this principle would result in a moral outrage. I have a sense that the idea to end domestic entitlement programs and instead spend all the money on foreign aid might be controversial among EAs and is almost certainly gonna be met with an outrage among the broader Democratic electorate. And if you go and say “I value my spouse/children/partners/friends no more than random Africans, and only spend extra effort on them so long as interactions with them are actively pleasant for me” – I think that even the vast majority of EAs are gonna start generating horrified screaming. At least, “horrified screaming” is what happened when one community member actually subscribed to this model of their own worth to their friends.
So I think that while it’s certainly true that liberals have a much weaker sense of *national* loyalty and perhaps a somewhat weaker sense of loyalty to birth family, I’m not even sure if this axis is even weaker for the inner circle of concern. And “these people have differently shaped circles of concern” seems like a weaker proposition than “these people work on fundamentally different moral foundations”.
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The problem with moral foundations theory is that if you take it seriously, you have to classify most people on the left as partial conservatives and most people on the right as partial liberals.
For example, when some people on the left argue that you should automatically believe women, that is partly ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect. When some people on the right argue that their women will get sexually abused by (trans) men in the bathroom, that is partly harm/care. When people on the right get upset about taxation taking too much money from those who sacrifice their time/effort/etc, that is partly fairness/reciprocity. When people on the left get far more upset at misogyny than misandry, that is partly respect & sanctity,
Of course, for most issues, many ‘moral foundations’ play a role, so you can pretend that liberals only care about ‘their’ foundations (and the same for conservatives) by ignoring the explanations, statements and behaviors that don’t fit the model. However, such an approach seems inimical to proper understanding.
I think that a far more reasonable conclusion is that just about everyone has the same basic moral mechanisms, but that they apply them differently. Just about everyone has ingroups and outgroups, where people care less about bad things happening to the outgroup. It’s just that people differ in what groups they designate as the ingroup and outgroup (and fargroup). Scott gave an example of this in how many people where very angry at him being happy at the death of Bin Laden, while those same people gloated over the death of Thatcher.
Just about everyone has a concept of fairness/reciprocity, but conservatives tend to focus more on letting people face the consequences of their behavior, where they tend to undervalue inability/limitations, while liberals tend to go overboard in the other direction. Both the argument that people should face the consequences of their behavior and the argument that people shouldn’t suffer for their inabilities, are fairness/reciprocity arguments. Just about everyone believes in purity/sanctity, but for one racism is the most impure thing and for another, it is people disparaging the sacrifice of soldiers. Etc.
Seeing this requires an outside view that is quite hard for people to adopt. For example, there are a decent number of studies that define morality based on the moral views or beliefs of the researchers & which then invariably conclude that the outgroup is (much more) morally vacuous, impervious to facts, etc than the ingroup. IMO, such studies don’t serve any purpose beyond othering the outgroup, just like this article does (which is ironic, given that fairness is claimed to be a liberal value and ingroup a conservative one).
I see the same complaints about liberals, both those that are high quality and low quality. Speaking of the latter, in the comments of Breitbart and the like, you can find uncharitable explanations for liberal behavior, just like this is uncharitable:
Finally, I want to point out that wanting to eliminate people with other belief systems is a dangerous form of Utopianism. Goals like justice, equality, happiness and an end to suffering cannot be fully achieved without destroying what makes people human. Furthermore, reality is so complex that applying one approach maximally results in horrible outcomes. For example, letting people face the full consequences of their behavior results in people dying in the streets, while maximally doing the opposite results in a society where people are much less concerned about doing things for others and mostly demand things for themselves.
A world with only pure liberals (or conservatives) will not be paradise and it will not give liberals (or conservatives) what they want. It will remove checks and balances and thereby probably result in horrible spirals based on false belief. For example, if pure conservatives are fully in power, one can imagine that cutting taxes or regulation will be seen as a good solution to any economic problem, even if under-taxation and under-regulation actually makes things worse. When pure liberals are in power, you can get the opposite, where the solution to any economic problem is more taxes and more regulation, even if over-taxation and over-regulation makes things worse.
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I’m skeptical of the scientific validity of moral foundations, but if they are real, I think you must be right that we all have the same set of them.
The name “moral foundations” seems to imply that they are terminal values, and Ozy seems to endorse that view. But I don’t think that’s right at all. If they exist, moral foundations are styles or patterns of moral reasoning. They’re not values in and of themselves. “Purity” can refer to avoiding GMOs or it can refer to avoiding certain kinds of sex or not eating pork. The same “foundational” style of reasoning can be directed by cultural concepts to value completely different ends.
If moral foundations explain the difference between left and right, it’s not because something essential in their makeup leads leftists and rightists to value incompatible things. It’s because a variation in their propensity for types of moral reasoning leads to a variation into which moral culture they are attracted into as they develop into adults.
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> I’m skeptical of the scientific validity of moral foundations, but if they are real, I think you must be right that we all have the same set of them.
It may be the case that we have the same set, but different weights for each of them. For example, how much suffering would you accept as a cost of your loyalty to your friends or family?
Then there are differences within each dimension about what counts. How much do you care about suffering of strangers compared to suffering of your friends? Is your sense of purity offended by blasphemy (and against which specific belief?) or by political incorrectness? Are you more loyal to your family, your friends, your company, or your nation?
And finally, there are people who have diminished perception of some dimension; for example psychopaths don’t care about harming people, and I suppose there exists specific blindness towards other dimensions, too.
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I feel similarly about the rise of (I will use the rationalist depreciative term for it, but because I don’t agree with this term, I’ll keep it in scare quotes) “political correctness”, and baffled about the median rationalist attitude towards “political correctness”.
I come from a conservative, Catholic country with a record-high track of violence against LGBT people (Brazil). I also come from a small town, and moved later into a relatively less conservative humongous metropolis. “Political correctness” had advanced further in the metropolis.
In the small town, if I walked around holding hands with someone of the same gender, I would be shouted at with slurs, and probably beaten. In the metropolis, at least in the fancier neighborhoods, both were significantly less likely. One time I was stalked by a car full of visibly neonazis; within minutes people on the streets came to our aid and started shaming the nazis.
Now here’s the thing. In a less “political correct” place, there’s this general atmosphere that to be visibly queer is shameful. In a more “political correct” place, there’s a similarly oppressive atmosphere about oppression itself. In one place, holding hands gaily feels wrong for the community. In the other place, shouting at people because they hold hands feels wrong for the community.
I postulate that these two things are mutually exclusive. There cannot be a society where it’s both ok to hold hands, and to shout at people because they hold hands. One or the other has, necessarily, to be vetted by the community as immoral. If there’s nothing wrong with holding hands, it follows that harming people who hold hands is an immoral act. Because I care about harm and fairness, and I don’t care about ingroupness, authority, or purity, it seems totally obvious to me which alternative is preferable. Therefore I now live, happily, in Germany.
Furthermore, things like hate speech laws and “PC media” are incredibly powerful tools for hacking the moral alignment of a community. Even if you privately believe that holding hands is immoral and deserving of shouting, if the law of the land says that shouting at them is wrong, it feels as if the Spirit of the Community has decreed that you’re wrong. And when the soap opera says that shouting is wrong, and the film actor you have a crush on says he hates it, and your bright teen niece says that people who do that are deplorable, then you start feeling bad about shouting; apply it society-wide, and you get a global reduction on the amount of shouting going on.
(I don’t think I have to elaborate on the notion that discourse is causally connected to violence: all the lynchings and killings are one output of a hellish social-psychological machine (“ideology”) whose inputs include the shouts and the jokes and the daily humiliation. But even in the absence of killings, there would still be a mutually exclusive choice between shunning the hand-holders, or shunning the hand-holding-shunners.)
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You make good points, but when you say that you don’t care about authority, you are also willing to use authority to get the result you think desirable:
That’s invoking the authority of the community and the authority of law to make the dissenter change their mind – if they say “I don’t care about whether you’re an authority or not, I’m going to break this law and continue to shun hand-holders”, then you social manipulation fails.
This is why I don’t think this neat division is all that neat – of course liberals have sacredness and authority and loyalty as values too, of course conservatives believe in harm and fairness as well.
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I think you’re conflating what principles purple should follow with what in practice affects how people behave. Just because someone is willing to use authority and social pressure to change other people’s behavior doesn’t mean they think social conformity and obedience to authority are inherently good.
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Really interesting post. I think it is fair to say that the various political affiliations aren’t all trying to do the same thing with different methods (mistake theory), that actually different people do have different goals for society (conflict theory).
Like I said on my blog the other week – https://bookishleftishgibberish.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/its-all-ideology/ –
“We aren’t beings of pure intellect who can look at graphs and spew out the objectively ideal way to order society. It’s not that graphs are bad – more facts would be good, more objective data would be good, more rational thought would be good. But we cannot escape from having an ideology. In using our reason and our knowledge, we also have to consider what it is we value, what society and individuals are to us, what sort of world we would like to make.”
I suspect Haidt’s theory has its flaws though. Liberals do have ingroup loyalty, just it isn’t in the form of flag-waving patriotism. They do have authority/respect values. And liberals do have purity-based values, though not of the conservative sort.
Another thing – what about leftists? I don’t consider myself a liberal or conservative. I’d rather identify as a leftist. So for example, many American liberals seem to describe the presidency as a noble office besmirched by Trump (an authority/respect position), whereas to me, he’s doing much the same awful stuff your presidents always have but he doesn’t disguise it with charm and professionalism like Obama did. Does Haidt have any theory about a leftist value system?
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I think that it’s not either conflict theory or mistake theory, but a bit of both.
As for the dislike of Trump or Obama not being entirely rational, it seems to me that a dislike of the other tribe’s culture plays a major role. Trump acts in a way that rubs the blue tribe the wrong way and Obama acted in a way that does the same for the red tribe.
Furthermore, the other sides’ president gets the assumption of bad faith while ‘their’ president gets the assumption of good faith. This is very evident in how quite a bit of the dislike evaporates for ex-presidents, who, once they no longer have the power to implement policies that are a danger to the ingroup, are no longer seen as that bad.
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I don’t really know a lot about contemporary US political philosophy, but frankly I’m astonished Jane Jacobs hasn’t been mentioned yet. The paper even references Ayn Rand, but not Jacobs.
I think Jacobs’ Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce and Politics – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_of_Survival – outlines the issue better than anyone else I’ve come across. Rather than labeling the moral syndromes “conservative” and “liberal” she recognises that both syndromes, which are fundamentally incompatible with each other, appear across the political spectrum.
Jacobs’ syndromes:
Guardian Moral Syndrome:
Shun trading
Exert prowess
Be obedient and disciplined
Adhere to tradition
Respect hierarchy
Be loyal
Take vengeance
Deceive for the sake of the task
Make rich use of leisure
Be ostentatious
Dispense largesse
Be exclusive
Show fortitude
Be fatalistic
Treasure honor
Commercial Moral Syndrome:
Shun force
Compete
Be efficient
Be open to inventiveness and novelty
Use initiative and enterprise
Come to voluntary agreements
Respect contracts
Dissent for the sake of the task
Be industrious
Be thrifty
Invest for productive purposes
Collaborate easily with strangers and aliens
Promote comfort and convenience
Be optimistic
Be honest
Jacobs argues that both of the syndromes are in fact necessary for different functions of the society. Generally different professions fall more or less neatly into the two syndromes. Jacobs explains that when she initially recognized that two syndromes exist, she thought that the guardian syndrome was inferior, outdated, barbaric and unnecessary; but upon researching further she realized that both syndromes are necessary. Government, NGOs, religion and agriculture (among others) fall into the guardian syndrome, while most of the private sector and science fall into the commercial syndrome.
Jacobs presents an intriguing argument that many of the societal problems of the modern world are a consequence of mixing syndromes: Applying the guardian syndrome to a function that is inherently “commercial” in nature, or vice versa.
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Ah, I don’t know. I think that Moral Foundations study was on shaky ground to begin with – what, liberals don’t have sacred values? Yeah, try questioning (for example) “a woman’s right to choose” and prepare to get “bodily autonomy” waved in your face like the flag. And what was that study where it turned out the labels on the axes had been switched (or something) so the actual result was the opposite of what it had been touted as? All the people who had been using that to go “See? We told you conservatives are Fascists! This totally scientific study proves they score high on authoritarianism!” suddenly went “Nah, this means nothing, it’s not at all important, look at the other scores” when it turned out the liberals were the high-scoring authoritarians.
So I’m very dubious of neat boxes like this to cram people into.
Again, as a conservative, I wasn’t particularly upset by that – not to the call for it to be banned stage, anyway. I eye-rolled about “yeah, the usual tricks when you’ve nothing else to say and desperately need a gimmick to stand out from the rest of the modern art crowd” – Épater la bourgeoisie is the good old reliable fallback there.
As for it being piss or whatever, that didn’t matter to me. I mentally replace it as a plastic crucifix dipped in Lucozade (same resulting image). I don’t find it beautiful or meaningful, it’s a gimmick ridden hard and not producing any particularly striking or profound result. A lot of his other work revolving around the same topic at the same time also moved me to indifference – I think if you’re not familiar with Catholic iconography or grown up with holy pictures and statues and the superstitions that accrete around their use, then work like Serrano’s will strike you as “oooh, how daring“. Whereas for me, it was “Reverse negative of the Child of Prague? Oh what, I’m supposed to go ‘Black baby Jesus! How challenging to our preconceptions and Western Christian colonialist hegemony!’ am I? Yeah well maybe if I’d never seen statues of St Martin de Porres before, perhaps!”
Mind you, when I was younger, the outrage bait probably would have worked on me, but eventually I worked out that hey, I was intended to react by jumping up and down with anger, otherwise the trick wouldn’t work, and then I stopped doing that 🙂
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I find moral foundations confusing. I would say I’m a conservative because I:
– Am usually rules based over case based because I believe that predictable rules + a method to adjust those rules produces better results (from a Rawlsian utilitarian perspective).
– Am generally skeptical of human nature as expressed, so I don’t want to put a lot of power in the place of reformers to make radical changes. Also, Chesteron’s fence / Darwinian cultural evolution / a lot of skulls on the side of radical reformers who were pretty sure that previous generations were blind to the free lunch that had been sitting around uneaten all those years.
Am I now supposed to conclude that’s all false consciousness, and I just want to help my bros and avoid thinking about icky butt stuff?*
* Clarification: I don’t think I think that butt stuff is icky, but I’m strongly fallabilist, so if Jonathan Haight wants to make a case that I actually do unbeknownst to myself, I’m open to hearing his case.
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Thinking about this a little more, I guess the problem I’m having is whether Haidt, et al are measuring the ultimate values of liberals and conservatives or just expressions of those values.
Here is his moral foundations questionnaire. A couple spoilers if you want to take the test clean – if so, do that before reading further:
If you answer that “Whether God approves of something” or “Chastity is an important value” is an important factor to consider when deciding whether something is right or wrong, then Haidt will increase your “purity” score, and Ozy will assume that you are a moral mutant who makes decisions based on whether something grosses you out.
It seems to me that begs the question of why you think God’s will or chastity is important. Maybe you’re a God-fearing person who thinks God exists and wants us to help the poor. Maybe you’re Jordan Peterson and you think God is the reification of utilitarian principles, or something. Maybe you think chastity helps to form healthy relationships and families, or to get more done.
I think if you squint, Haidt’s questions arguably make some vague sense, but if I think it’s a giant step to think that people who think “whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group,” or “I am proud of my country’s history” is relevant to whether a decision is wrong don’t think you have a moral duty to outgroups. They may just be opposed to betrayal.
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A game I play is to substitute “God” and “Society” for each other whenever one appears. Very often there is no change in the meaning of a given statement. Particularly when a politician is making the statement.
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In this context, I would assume that people who believe in a benevolent God would put a lot of importance on whether God approves of something in determining whether something, and people who don’t would put none on it.
That doesn’t tell us what those people think God approves of, or even if they’re confident that they know what God approves of.
I take it that Haidt assumes that respondents believe that God strongly opposes people doing disgusting things, and doesn’t give a toss about helping the weak, and that atheists by definition cannot possibly be as motivated by disgust as believers, but it seems like a big assumption.
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The problem is that almost everyone does believe in God, it’s just that some people ascribe all the non-concretely-anthropomorphic (but still supernatural) aspects to other abstract constructs with different names. Look at the explicitly animistic way in which guns are described, or how anti-sex work “crusaders” use language that would be perfectly normal in a house of worship.
The question should be “what is the difference between those who believe in an explicitly supernatural God, and one who’s god is supposedly a mental shorthand for complex natural interactions?”
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Conservatives and liberals fundamentally cannot both get what they want.
This presupposes that neither liberals nor conservatives are capable of living in a pluralistic society. Maybe it’s true. But if either side is willing to not impose their views on others, then they could live as they chose. Though, there are people (I have met them) that believe there is no difference between what one should do and what one should be forced to do. Such a person cannot happily live in a morally heterogeneous society.
While we’re talking about aesthetics, was there a thread to talk about the new motto?
As someone who spent a lot of time in a small authoritarian religious society and time assisting others who choose to leave it, the new motto sets off many alarms.
-While I like the explicit rejection of the naturalistic fallacy, it seems blatantly technocratic utopian, a tradition that has the highest body count of any in history — irrespective of which governmental or economic system to which it is applied. I know you didn’t live through McNamara, so you probably don’t have the same horror that I do toward technocracy.
-“Justice” is perfectly correlated with violence. That’s what justice means, it’s the determination of the circumstances under which violence is righteous.
-“The gradual supplanting” indicates active action to bring others into compliance, which when coupled with “just” and the technocratic bent of the whole leads to all sorts of bad images. The “gradual” part calls to mind flirty fishing, subversion, and other frog-boiling tactics.
TL;DR: it reminds me an awful lot of recruiters I met in my youth who’s organizations made the lives of those recruited worse in the long run. It has a kind of “aperture science” vibe to it, though it’s not nearly as creepy as the real life motto of Particle Measuring Systems which is “without measurement, there is no control.”
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I suggest the use of Google. It is a quote by Martha Nussbaum about wild-animal welfare, which she does not intend to promote by flirting with the animals. Nussbaum has a “thick” conception of justice– she defines it as the provision of certain essential capabilities required for a being’s flourishing. I am not sure what you mean by “technocratic,” but Nussbaum (and I) emphasize the importance of individual freedom, and the whole purpose of the word “gradual” is to imply that the path towards justice is being done in a cautious and reversible fashion.
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maybe having two different societies is enough of a compromise?
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Like in many things, you can learn from us: pillarisation
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This is very good and correct. Conservatives and progressives are and will always be in conflict. This has always felt obvious to me, but it is very rare to find someone else who states it out loud.
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This discussion seems odd coming right after the last post on trans categories. In that post we parse extremely rare edge cases like androgen insensitivity syndrome, and indeed trans experiences as causing problems for categories like “woman”. We have intense debates about how even relatively concrete biological things like chromosomes and sex organs fit in to that.
In this post we assume that a conservative/liberal split is something that is relatively binary, easily categorized, and actually grounded in concrete psychology (a science no where near as well established as biology). We assume that stereotypes about that split unproblematically describe real things.
But gender stereotypes are at least as robustly grounded as conservative/liberal stereotypes. (Which is to say not very).
So why do we use evidentiary standards in this discussion that would get chewed into little pieces and laughed at here in a male/female binary description?
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I explicitly pointed out that the science here may not replicate but is probably getting at something real. I used the phrase “tend to” a lot. Several people in the comments have pointed out examples of conservatives with liberal moral values and liberals with conservative moral values. And I am explicitly on board with it being okay to discuss “men” and “women” when you mean “the set of things that are true of the average cisgender dyadic man/woman, but may not be true for outliers”– although a caveat about outliers existing often is helpful.
Eh, good point, should add a caveat.
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“When I read writing by a person who only has the fairness/reciprocity intuition, I seethe with anger”
Is that the right characterization of hardcore libertarian morality that Caplan represents?
Haidt himself has tentatively added a sixth moral foundation to account for the moral psychology of libertarians.
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I tend to think of the “ingroup/loyalty” and “authority/respect” foundations as merely important means, and not as ends in themselves. I also think of purity/sanctity as not being a matter of morality at all. I guess that makes me a liberal?
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Where does valuing truth/honesty fit into Haidt’s pillars? You could make an argument for Fairness/reciprocity, or even harm/care or purity, but none of them is that good a fit I don’t think.
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Anybody want to talk about whether Haidt and co-authors are stealing a base? Reading over their page detailing critiques and responses, it seems to me that a frequent criticism is whether they have accurately identified root moral values, or whether in many cases those values are proxies for harm. Haidt’s titles on all his responses are delightful, but I feel like the whole discussion is befogged and would appreciate thoughts.
Ok, Haidt uses the example of an undergraduate who is asked “A man tells you that he likes to have sex with dead animals. Is that wrong?” She answers yes, then when asked why, Haidt determines that her attempts to identify possible harms are a rationalization, and that her initial moral intuition is related to purity/disgust. Ok, I’m with you so far, and I’d go father and say that I would bet that American conservatives are probably more likely to support laws against necrobestiality than American liberals are.
I think that philosophically, I’m not really satisfied that conservatives are substantially more motivated by non-harm factors than liberals. I’d have two follow up questions:
1) If actually convinced that there was no harm from a particular intuitively offensive practice, and that there was a benefit, would conservatives change their minds? My guess is sometimes yes, maybe often, but I don’t see how Haidt’s process captures that. If conservatives think that chaotic sexuality is net harmful, then an ick-reaction to necrobestiality is at least consistent, but to test it, you would have to figure out whether that conservative believes it.
2) Granting that some moral judgments are intuitively based, I’m not sure how Haidt’s questions figure that out. If I say that “betrayal of a group” is something that should be considered when determining whether something is right or wrong, is that because I’m intuitively motivated by lying, or is it because I think a high-trust society is the optimal utilitarian environment? (Because I definitely do think that second thing, to the point where I cry when they sing about Salt Lake City in Book of Mormon, but my answer gets scored +1 in-group the same as Al Capone’s). Worse, if I answer yes to “I’m proud of my country’s history,” Haidt assumes that I make moral judgments based on in-group values, which seems like extreme question begging to me.
3) I think Haidt misses the most important intuitive axis – selfishness. Again, I don’t know how to determine whether when a college student says other college should be free to them, that’s motivated by an intuitive desire for free stuff or it’s motivated by a desire to avoid harm, but if Haidt knows, I’d like to see it.
I suspect that Haidt has some framework to get past all this, but I don’t get it, and would appreciate any thoughts.
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This article by Haidt explains why the project of turning people into perfect globalists will fail. Globalism creates threats to communities (at the national or more local level) which results in anti-globalism.
Note that the article focuses on the anti-globalist elements from the right, but something similar can be said about large parts of the left, who become extremely authoritarian when actual diversity enters their bubble. It does manifest a bit differently, for example, that group is rarely nationalist, but more often communitarian.
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You’re not thinking in terms of effective altruism.
From this article:
Therefore, from your value system, non-Western people are evil and it is in your self-interest to shame the expression of their cultures, indoctrinate the children, and work for a future where their cultures are no longer represented on this Earth. And this would probably be much more effective than bothering with local conservatives, for the usual reasons given by effective altruists arguing against philanthrolocalism, considering there are much more non-Western people than Western conservatives.
I do not endorse this conclusion, but only because I think the premises of your post are a misrepresentation of moral foundations theory. However, I don’t see any principled way for you to not endorse this conclusion while still endorsing the conclusion of your post.
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Yes, I agree, I am not a cultural relativist. I didn’t realize a cultural relativist was commenting on this blog. I’m not sure I’ve ever met one before, and I’m deeply curious. Can you explain to me how you respond to the standard “your beliefs imply that not judging people’s moral beliefs is a universal moral rule in spite of your lack of belief in universal moral rules” criticism? I’m sure there’s a strong response I happen to be unfamiliar with because I’ve mostly seen the viewpoint as a strawman.
Is your argument that it is easier to persuade people in developing countries (in spite of obvious problems like not speaking the language and not having any cultural context) because we have already picked the low-hanging public health, education, and development fruit in the developed world, but that fruit generally remains unpicked in the developing world? That seems like a very unusual claim. Can you walk me through the logic?
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I’m not a cultural relativist either. However, shaming the expression of non-Western cultures and indoctrinating the children of non-Western people isn’t simply not being a cultural relativist, it’s colonialism (when talking about non-Western people in non-Western countries) and support for fairly radical assimilationism and anti-multiculturalism (when talking about non-Western people in Western countries). (It’ll also get you called an alt-right racist white supremacist by a lot of people.)
There is nothing shameful about supporting that, but it’s *unexpected* from a leftist social justice advocate who ban the alt-right from their blog. Maybe I was wrong about a facet of your thought system, in which case it would be interesting if you wrote more about this.
I’m a mistake theorist both intra-culturally and cross-culturally, so I don’t see where you are going with this paragraph, which seem to ask whether I’m an intra-cultural conflict theorist and cross-cultural mistake theorist, which I’m not.
I’m not sure if you understood what I believe, so I’ll put it more clearly: I believe that if you are an intra-cultural conflict theorist, then to be coherent you must also be a cross-cultural conflict theorist.
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[content warning: female genital mutilation, famine]
Let’s avoid the term “mistake theorist” and “conflict theorist” for the time being, because I’m not sure what you mean by them.
I have no problems with most aspects of other people’s cultures. I think it is fine for people to wear different clothes, eat different foods, speak different languages, practice different hobbies, have different relationship structures, celebrate different holidays, and so on and so forth; no doubt many people will choose to continue to have the clothes, foods, languages, hobbies, relationship structures, and holidays of their childhoods. I think it is wrong to burn off little girls’ clitorises. I do not think that burning off little girls’ clitorises is a thing people do because they are modern utilitarians who are merely very confused about whether burning off little girls’ clitorises maximizes global utility. I think it is obvious that it does not do so. They burn off little girls’ clitorises because they think that it is bad for women to be sluts and it is justified to torture little girls in order to make sure that they are not sluts.
(By all means, feel free to explain the thoughtful utilitarian justification for burning off little girls’ clitorises.)
As a practical matter, I have no power to prevent the burning off of little girls’ clitorises. This is advocacy that must occur from within the culture; any action I can take would cause more harm than good. (Recall that famous “let us all act according to our national customs” line that supporters of colonialism love to trot out? The British colonization of India also included Winston Churchill deliberately causing the Bengal famine of 1943. I encourage you to click the link and read it in great detail.)
However, evil actions continue to be evil if I cannot personally prevent them. There are lots of evil actions I am personally unable to prevent. I do not go “well, goodness, I can’t rescue every Rohingya, therefore genocide is fine.” I do not go “hm, upon examination I cannot control whether the president drops nukes, therefore the total nuclear annihilation of all life is okay.” US foreign policy is not morally neutral because I live in California, only to become evil should I move to a swing state.
As to your second point: You said that the same arguments apply for value change in developing countries as apply to ending global poverty. So your thesis is:
1) Let us stipulate for the sake of argument that it is a good goal to try to change other people’s values.
2) We have already picked the low-hanging public health, education, and development fruit in the developed world, but that fruit generally remains unpicked in the developing world.
3-X) ????
Conclusion: It is more cost-effective to change people’s values in the developing world than in the developed world.
I am curious what you would put in 3-X.
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“Winston Churchill deliberately causing the Bengal famine of 1943.”
According to wikipedia, the specific contention that Churchill “deliberately” caused the famine amounts to nothing more and nothing less than that his war cabinet refused to allocate ships to bring grain.
Here’s a graph of allied losses to U-Boats during the war.
atlantic.ipynb
hosted with ❤ by GitHub
The period of 1942 through 1943 was the height of the battle of the Atlantic.
Maybe the war cabinet made the wrong choice. Maybe they could have afforded to send those ships. But I don’t think it’s right to simply summarize that decision as “Churchill deliberately caused the famine”, like it was a premeditated genocide, like it was the Holodomor. That war cabinet had *awful* decisions to make. It was a cataclysmic war, with millions and millions dead, with “allies” that were almost as bad as the enemy, if not worse, with horrific industrial genocide the likes of which the world had never seen, with whole cities in flames, with the fate of Britain and maybe democracy anywhere in the balance.
Maybe they should have sent grain ships to Bengal, but that’s not the same thing at all as what you said.
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@ozymandias
I mean the words as Scott used them, and as you mean by it when you say you are a conflict theorist. Mistake theory argue that we should resolve disagreement through discussion, and conflict theory argue that we should resolve disagreement through social shaming and indoctrination.
Sure.
Obviously. Mistake theory doesn’t mean relativism. If anything, the reverse is true, considering conflict theorists are the one saying political disagreement is based on disagreement on subjective morality and mistake theorists are the one saying political disagreement is based on disagreement on objective facts. Conflict theory isn’t compatible with moral realism because a moral realist would say people who have different moralities are mistaken about morality. Mistake theory is compatible with both moral realism and, for a lack of a better term, moral universalist non-realism.
Er… You kinda addressed your own remark, didn’t you ? They do that because they believe being promiscuous is bad.
I think burning off little girls’ clitorises is wrong, but you’re not being very charitable to the opposing position here.
(#out of context quotes robnost style)
I’m not sure what this is supposed to argue for. If the argument is that you would like to be able to have a progressive colonialist superpower shaming the expression of non-Western cultures and indoctrinating the children of non-Western people, but that would be harmful for X reasons, then I encourage you to apply this argument to your original post. I think there are two beliefs you hold which aren’t coherent with each other. Whether you will solve that logical incoherence by becoming a mistake theorist or by becoming a neoreactionary is up to you (though the latter would be hilarious). (I am myself a mistake theorist.)
There are many more non-Western people than Western conservatives, and Western conservatives are, relatively speaking, more liberal than non-Western people. (In fact, even Western countries can be radically different from each other politically: for example, in some European countries, the idea of not supporting socialized healthcare and free college is outside the Overton Window, yet in America here we are.)
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@ozymandias
I think there is a problem here which is that all of these things are seldom (if ever) actually ethically neutral. Not every cuisine can be equally well switched to ethically sourceable raw materials without completely losing its identity – not to mention that as they already are, different cuisines have massively different environmental and animal suffering impacts. Languages that are gender-neutral already are better than languages that can be made to support gender-neutrality with some amount of effort, and these are in turn better than languages that can only make gender-neutral statements after a massive overhaul of grammar and vocabulary to the point of being largely unintelligible to most speakers who are not on board with the project. Most relationship structures in every society ever are… dunno if “abusive” is the right word, but “bring enormous suffering to at least some people involved” is definitely true; relationships styles that at least attempt to not make anyone involved miserable seem to be a rather modern invention. Some holiday traditions are absolutely 100% horrible, and the entire spirit and meaning of the holiday is terrible, such that you can leave only its name if you try to celebrate it ethically, and yet others are terrible in everything including the name. I’m even gonna grant the radfem argument that if a culture tries to coerce some of its members into wearing massively impractical and actively bad for one’s health clothes, that many people hate wearing, then choosing to wear them is not ethically neutral, but rather constitutes defection against the effort to change the norm. And cultures that have more of an expectation and pressure to wear such things are worse than the cultures that have less of it.
Now, there can certainly be practical arguments against trying to change some of these things. You can say that micromanaging people’s lives tends to bring misery and be hugely ineffective, so there probably should be some cut-off of low-key badness of life choices, below which you don’t intervene. You can have other goals such as valuing linguistic diversity, which would be an incentive against steamrolling over languages (although in my opinion, English-speaking linguists are in a complete denial about the costs that certain linguistic features have on the speakers of these languages, because these linguists ripe all the benefits of having more languages to work with while bearing no cost whatsoever because they themselves speak English). You can say that practically, Westerners have an abysmal track record of trying to change other cultures, and most of the time end up destroying stuff that was morally neutral or even better than the enforced alternatives, which is why extreme caution and 100% certainty that the thing being intervened on is of paramount importance before attempting it again. And indeed, it’s often way more efficient to try intervening on one’s own culture, since that tends to encounter less resistance.
But these practical considerations don’t really address the core of the problem: while there’s probably not a single best way to have a culture, and it’s perfectly possible to have a diversity of equally ethical cultures, every practically existing culture is doing most things wrong.
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@Sophia
What percentage of people do you think prefer to be identified by and/or treated differently by their gender? Are they wrong to want that? If so, for what reason?
Is your ‘better’ based on an analysis of the needs and/or desires of the average person, or merely based on what you yourself prefer?
Marriage makes everyone miserable? Is that really something that you want to argue?
It’s pretty obvious to me that people’s ethical beliefs tend to be shaped strongly by their own preferences and many rationalize their beliefs around their natural desires.
It’s pretty easy to come up with a narrative to dismiss something as wrong, whether that is gay marriage or hetero marriage, or anything else. Especially when one can just ignore unpleasant facts, which is done constantly, to protect the ‘moral’ narrative.
Perhaps, although we live in a time where colonialism is considered extremely morally wrong in itself, by most people. Saying positive things about something that is considered extremely morally wrong generally results in cognitive dissonance, which people resolve by not making an honest assessment of the facts, but by only focusing on the bad sides and ignoring the good.
Furthermore, those that dare speak out against the taboo are commonly vilified, resulting in a strong imbalance in the extent to which people dare to argue against the taboo’d concept vs those that dare to argue in favor.
Ironically, these mechanisms have always hampered progressivism, yet many on the left are employing these same mechanisms to defend their own orthodoxy. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.
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@Lawrence D’Anna
After googling, my personal opinion is that I don’t have the tools to judge whether Churchill can reasonably be said to have caused the Bengal famine intentionally. It seems like historians are vigorously arguing both sides without a clear expert consensus.
– Pro: The British knew the famine was first threatening and then occurring, and were able to ship food to many places, notwithstanding the losses to u-boats, including shipping food past India. Churchill hated Gandhi, and said various racist things about hating the Indians and being willing to see them starve. I believe Churchill actually instructed the Canadians not to send food.
– Con: Racism notwithstanding, Churchill seems to have tried to get food to India on a number of occasions, including asking Roosevelt (eventually) to help. (Roosevelt also refused, FWIW). The theories of people arguing for food – that even relatively limited increases in food shipments would have a multiplier effect as food prices dropped and people stopped hording – are untested. (As a result of Britain not sending more food).
Ultimately, the case against Churchill seems to be it was within his power to do more (at some cost) and that he arguably would have done more if the people starving had been white subjects of the Empire. Those accusations seem plausible, but again, I am not familiar enough with the details to be confident.
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It sounds to me like the three cited conservative values (ingroup loyalty, respect for authority, purity) are some mix of conservatism and authoritarianism. Mao’s communists were neither conservative nor right-wing, but cared a lot about these three values.
And among my local social justice crowd, some people care about these values a lot more than others (which is also a pretty good measure of how well I tend to get on with them).
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I’m not really understanding the flip in the last few paragraphs.
You admit that war is bad in of itself. So why then does the “fundamental” differences matter? Don’t war as it’s bad!
(Unless you feel your interests are more important that the bad that come from the war. Which might be so, but given that one of your example interests is an artistic piece, something probably what you aren’t willing to go to war for.)
And with it, shouldn’t you first think about whether shaming and indoctrination (the other side) are good things in themselves first? Is it that much better than war?
Is there that much of a need to “finalize” things?
The answer might not be to try and straighten certain facts on the assumption that everyone is working towards a common goal, but it does not have to be attacking or eliminating other people’s values either.
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So, let me introduce you to this field called “evolutionary aesthetics”…
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But if this is true, then American conservatives is the least thing to worry about. You mentioned yourself that differences between cultures might be much greater than between political camps. And there happened to be some few hundreds of different cultures on Earth. What are the chances that they all, or majority of them, share American Liberal values? Chances are, when you framing a conflict like this, it’s not just conservatives, it’s the most of the world whose values you want to obliterate with extreme prejudice.
Now, of course, this should not be considered as evidence about this being truth or not. But if I knew with 99.99% certainty that your initial proposition is true, then I would be worried – horrified in fact – about these implications, not about what it would mean for American politics.
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If I agreed with Ozy, I would be a neoreactionary.
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Huh. Looks like my comment was deleted. That’s your right of course, but I wish you’d explained why.
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I’m moderating more tightly because this post was linked on SSC; there’s a note at the top of the post.
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For the record, I do not think you want to “commit genocide, kidnap children, commit murder, put people in concentration camps, etc”, and I sincerely apologize if I gave the impression that I thought so.
I am worried about that kind of mayhem, not because I think you’re advocating for it, but because I think the current trend towards political polarization has the potential for getting that bad. I view your argument here as pro-polarization, not pro-genocide, and we simply have different estimates on a factual level as to how justified and/or dangerous polarization is.
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I haven’t read the rest of the post or the comments yet, so maybe there’s a twist and I’ll be horribly humiliated and snakes will physically manifest in my house and so on, but–
I think the popularity of this early version of Haidt’s model is more toxoplasma-of-rage than anything else. Haidt himself might agree with a more charitable restatement of that — see here.
Liberals want to believe that conservatives believe in nonsensical bullshit (and that they’re more Evolved than everyone else — I mean, these are to an if not large then at least genealogically relevant extent the people who built the British Empire, so that’s to be expected), and conservatives want to believe that liberals are literally incapable of moral reasoning. When a study comes out that purports to demonstrate that conservatives believe in nonsensical bullshit and liberals are literally incapable of moral reasoning, what do you expect to happen?
The problem I see with that is that liberals rely on the other three foundations all the time. This is getting increasingly obvious — I tried to point this out a few years ago in an article when I had a net-mag real enough to get me the occasional press pass, and back then all I had was, like, Swedish politicians calling nationalism a “disgusting disease” and Gaians waxing puristic about The Environment. This was before “Kill Climate Deniers”, which is some sort of stage show which I heard about from an ad on the subway (really), and before Russiaghazi. I think those two data points might make the case against pop-Haidtianism a little easier.
(There’s also a [fairly accurate, IME] stereotype that SJ types call things “gross” a lot. If there are any grad students in something close enough to corpus linguistics in the audience, you might be able to get a paper or two out of studying political affiliation and moral-disgust language.)
If you look for liberal use of a particular foundation, you’ll find it. If you don’t, you won’t. We should assume that this is equally true of conservatives. IIRC, the test codes those foundations conservative — “purity” is primarily about religious purity and “authority” is primarily about conservative-coded institutions like the military. What about professors? Do professors have authority?
As Haidt has since spent a lot of time and energy pointing out, is that you don’t see your own culture as culture. Body Ritual Among the Nacirema and so on. Those weird people over there have tribal authority-attachments to archaic institutions like the military — they’d be so much more Evolved if they trusted, believed, and followed journalists and professors!
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[Cross-posted from my blog] [Wrote as an answer to Conservatives As Moral Mutants (just like last time, part of me feels like the link is self-trigger-warning, but I guess I will just warn you that this is not a clever attention-grabbing title, the link means exactly what it says and argues it at some length)]
[Everyone: please, please, please stay on the meta-level and do not take anything written here as endorsing or criticizing any political position.]
I am in favor in moral foundations theory, at least on even-numbered days, so I may correct some of your (hopefully honest) misconceptions.
Here is a table from Mapping the Moral Domain. It’s the one which show that liberals and conservatives have different moral foundations. It also put the lie to your article in more than one way.
This table show that the average liberal does value Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. In fact, very few liberals have zero scores at those. Using an handy normal distribution calculator, about 7% of liberals have a zero score on Purity/Sanctity while practically none (a few hundredths of a percent) have zero scores on Ingroup/Loyalty or Authority/Respect. The political psychology claims of moral foundations theory are merely about the averages. This make trying to eliminate these values a dubious endeavor, even from a point of view of pure endarkened self-interest.
Now, this is not to be confused with the point you’re talking about there:
The vast majority of liberals value Purity/Sanctity, and everyone value Ingroup/Loyalty and Authority/Respect. The “some” in “some liberals use” is “every”. (The “some” in “some conservatives only have” is “no”, and no liberal only have the “liberal” moral foundations either.) I mean, look at this graph: even extremely liberal people have average Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity scores that are between 3 and 4. You aren’t acknowledging this. Now, this isn’t necessarily fatal to your argument. You could postulate that, yes, liberals and conservatives both value Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity, but they still value it differently, so ideological total war with destruction of the enemy as a goal is justified anyway. But then the solution move from a troglodyte first-square-of-the-glowing-brain-meme level “shame any valuing of Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, or Purity/Sanctity” to something more complicated like “don’t shame any valuing of Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, or Purity/Sanctity but shame valuing of it above a certain level”, which quickly sound less tractable.
But even this would be an erroneous viewpoint. This bring me to my second point. Moral foundations isn’t bimodal. There isn’t on one hand the liberal-typical moral foundations people and on the other hand the conservative-typical moral foundations people. This table show that moderates exist and have intermediate scores. Your post completely ignore them, even though 34% of Americans are moderates while only 25% are liberals, as would be expected from a normal distribution. And politics isn’t a liberal/moderate/conservative ternary. This graph divide even further, with the expected results. There is simply no way to divide people between liberal-typical moral foundations people and conservative-typical moral foundations people. You would need either an arbitrary cutoff or something like “liberal-typical moral foundations people are people who are more liberal-typical than the median American”, and the latter change when the moral foundations of the average American change, so if you’re trying to shame that, you’re simply going to shame more and more people until you shamed everyone to the right of you out of society, which means that being the rightmost, you will be the shamed person.
That was just one table. But I shouldn’t focus too much on this. I should instead focus on the fact that you claim to ground your post in Haidt’s moral foundations theory, but, to put it bluntly, and with all due respect, it stands in the same relation to actual moral foundations theory as The Earth Not a Globe Review to modern astronomy. That is, it may start with the same basic observations, but the conclusions are so radically opposite to each other that preceding what you believe about your political opponents with “[b]ut my read of the psychological evidence is that” is a terminological inexactitude.
In The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism, Graham and Haidt divide moral foundations into four tenets.
Nativism: There is a “first draft” of the moral mind
Cultural learning: The first draft gets edited during development within a particular culture
Intuitionism: Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second
Pluralism: There were many recurrent social challenges in our evolutionary history, so there are many moral foundations
Nativism and cultural learning aren’t interesting to us here, so I’ll stick to talking about social intuitionism and moral pluralism. Moral pluralism is the thing you seem to confuse moral foundations theory with, but you completely ignore (and in fact directly contradict) social intuitionism. This is rather troubling, because leading moral foundations theorists think social intuitionism is a very important part of moral foundations theory. For example, here is The Righteous Mind’s official website’s about page (emphasis mine):
I have no idea if you have read The Righteous Mind. I can’t find any record of you saying that you did, so I guess not, but if you did, then you seem to have completely missed its point, because of the three parts of the book, only part II is about moral pluralism, while the other parts are about social intuitionism.
Social intuitionism is a model that proposes that moral positions and judgments are:
primarily intuitive (“intuitions come first”)
rationalized, justified, or otherwise explained after the fact
taken mainly to influence other people, and are
often influenced and sometimes changed by discussing such positions with others
Notice the second tenet: social intuitionism say that people rationalize their moral positions and judgments, meaning a person who value Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity will rationalize, justify, and explain these values after the fact as good values that further the goal of . This isn’t conflict theory. This is ~mistake theory~, plus it say that people have cognitive biases that make them rationalize their moral positions and judgements. Meanwhile, your model offer zero explanation of why conservatives think conservative policies are good for society and argue for this. In fact, it seem to deny this very basic fact in the “And yet, fundamentally…” paragraph.
And notice the fourth tenet, which is the most damning of all. Social intuitionism say that moral positions and judgments are often influenced and sometimes changed by discussing such positions with others. This position is also known as “mistake theory”, the view that recognize debate as essential instead of thinking of it as having a minor clarifying role at best. You can’t be more clear than that in explaining how moral foundations theory is a mistake-theoretic worldview.
Your post isn’t founded in moral foundations theory. Your post is a denial of social intuitionism, and therefore a denial of moral foundations theory, because conflict theory is a denial of social intuitionism, and therefore a denial of moral foundations theory. I try to be nice. I really do. But I will say it – your argument that conflict theory is correct because of moral foundations theory is unacceptably shoddy.
To end on a less argumentative note: Here is a pretty graph from The Righteous Mind which explain social intuitionism. Never let it be said that social psychology can’t be pretty.
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Argh I did a formatting error at the beginning of my comment. Edit button when ?
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Wait, why does this include the trigger warning, which doesn’t make any sense in this context, only in the context of my blog.
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As in, why would I put a link to the post I’m answering to ? Seriously, edit button when ?
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I’m so sorry for spamming your comment section because I am an idiot who cross-post without checking if the headers still make sense in context.
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As per the comment policy, Paperclip Minimizer has been banned for sapping my will to write.
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